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Abstract
Security of embedded computing systems is becoming of paramount concern
as these devices become more ubiquitous, contain personal information and are
increasingly used for financial transactions. Security attacks targeting embedded
systems illegally gain access to the information in these devices or destroy in-
formation. The two most common types of attacks embedded systems encounter
are code-injection and power analysis attacks. In the past, a number of counter-
measures, both hardware- and software-based, were proposed individually against
these two types of attacks. However, no single system exists to counter both of
these two prominent attacks in a processor based embedded system. Therefore,
this paper, for the first time, proposes a hardware/software based countermeasure
against both code-injection attacks and power analysis based side-channel attacks
in a dual core embedded system. The proposed processor, named SecureD, has an
area overhead of just 3.80% and an average runtime increase of 20.0% when com-
pared to a standard dual processing system. The overhead were measured using
a set of industry standard application benchmarks, with two encryption and five
other programs.
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1 Introduction
Multiple processors have been used on a single chip as the increasing functionality
of embedded systems demands more processing power. Consumer devices such as
mobile phones already deploy dual processors in their designs [46]. An increasing
number of such embedded systems have to overcome security threats. Potential targets
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of adversaries vary from low-end systems such as wireless handsets, networked sensors
and smart cards, to high-end systems such as network routers, gateways, firewalls and
servers.
Security threats in embedded systems could be classified by the means used to
launch attacks. Typical launch methods are: physical, logical and side-channel. Phys-
ical attacks refer to unauthorized physical access to the embedded system itself and
are feasible only when the attacker has direct access to the system. Such attacks are
identified by packaging mechanisms, such as tamper evident packing (make an at-
tempted attack apparent so that subsequent inspection will show an attack had been
attempted) [45]. Logical attacks exploit weaknesses in logical systems such as soft-
ware or a cryptographic protocol to gain access to unauthorized information. Logical
attacks are deployed easily against systems which are able to download and execute
software and have vulnerabilities in their design. Side-channel attacks are performed
by observing properties of the system (such as power consumption or electromagnetic
emission) while the system performs cryptographic operations. Unlike physical at-
tacks, logical and side-channel attacks are application specific and could be diagnosed
and prevented by software and/or architectural techniques.
Most recent logical attacks result in demolishing code integrity of an application
program [31]. They dynamically change instructions with the intention of gaining
control over the execution flow of a program. Attacks that are involved in violating
software/code integrity are called code-injection attacks. Code-injection attacks often
exploit common implementation mistakes in application programs, which are referred
to as security vulnerabilities. The number of malicious attacks always increases with
the amount of software code [11]. The most known side-channel attack is the power
analysis attack [24], where secret keys used in an encryption program were successfully
predicted by observing the power dissipation from a chip. Devices like smart cards
[10, 12], PDAs [17] and mobile phones [46] have microprocessor chips built inside,
performing secure transactions using secret keys. Power dissipation/consumption of
a chip is the most exploited property used to predict secret keys using side channel
attacks [26, 48].
A number of hardware- and software-based techniques, such as ARM® TrustZone
[3] and ARMOR [2] respectively, were proposed in the past as secure infrastructures.
However, they are not designed to detect/prevent the most frequently encountered log-
ical and side-channel attacks on embedded systems: code-injection and power analysis
attacks. There exist a number of individual detection mechanisms for these two attacks
in both software and architecture domains. However, to our knowledge, no single sys-
tem was proposed that is capable of thwarting or warning against both these attacks.
Therefore, this paper, for the first time, presents a secure dual core embedded system,
we call SecureD (for Secure Dual core), which both detects code-injection attacks and
protects against power analysis attacks. SecureD considers security as one of its design
objectives (as opposed to security being an afterthought in the design) [25] and uses
a hardware/software solution with microarchitectural changes to the processor design,
which makes the integration of security into the design and implementation much faster
and easier, while considerably reducing the overhead.
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Paper Organization
The rest of the paper is organized as follows. Section 2 summarizes previously pro-
posed countermeasures against both code-injection and power analysis attacks. The
microarchitecture description of SecureD is provided in Section 3. Section 4 illustrates
the design flow of our system. The experimental setup is presented in Section 5 and
the results are presented in Section 6. Finally, the paper is concluded in Section 8.
2 Related Work
In this section, we present a range of prior detection and prevention techniques, both
hardware- and software-based against both code-injection and power analysis attacks.
A wide range of techniques have been suggested in the past to detect/counter code-
injection attacks. They could broadly be categorized into software based and hard-
ware assisted techniques. Software-based techniques use software tools and methods to
overcome these attacks without changing the microarchitecture of the processor. Hard-
ware assisted techniques use additional hardware blocks or microarchitectural support
to detect code-injection attacks. Software-based techniques can be further categorized
into two: static and dynamic. Static techniques try to detect vulnerabilities at com-
pile time. Wagner et al. propose an automated static code analysis tool to detect code
that might invite buffer overflow attacks [44], but this produces a relatively large num-
ber of false positives. Another static technique uses a language that has only the safe
constructs of another language, for example, Cyclone [23]. Dynamic software based
techniques avoid or considerably reduce code injection attacks at runtime and they
either use formal methods to prove a program behaves as expected or use software
constructs to monitor proper program behaviour at runtime. Proof-Carrying Code [33]
is an example of the former and Stack Guard [14] the latter.
Hardware assisted techniques are mainly attack-specific. A number of researchers
[27, 29, 47] propose architectural detection of buffer overflow attacks which are a type
of code-injection attacks. Code-injection attacks can be detected by monitoring code
integrity of a program at runtime. Arora et al. [8] use an additional co-processor and
hardware tables to perform software/code integrity checks. This system identifies pro-
gram properties at different levels of granularity and stores multiple control flow levels
of data and checksums to perform software integrity monitoring. This method pro-
duces code that is not relocatable due to the pre-generated hardware tables. Ragel
and Parameswaran in their secure processor called IMPRES [35] use similar program
properties to that of [8], but only perform check-summing at the basic block level
and therefore reduce the complexity of their solution. However, IMPRES only detects
code-injection attacks and is designed for a single processor embedded system [36].
Similar to detection techniques for code-injection attacks, countermeasures against
power analysis attacks can be classified into software-based and hardware-based. Mask-
ing and current flattening are the two major software-based countermeasures. Table
and data masking techniques [13, 16, 19, 30] use random values during the actual
computation to prevent the processed data being exploited by the adversary. Mure-
san and Gebotys [32] proposed a current flattening technique, where the dissipated
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current is flattened by adding no-ops in the code to provide sufficient discharge. Am-
brose et al. [6] proposed a randomized instruction injection technique, where dummy
instructions were injected during the actual execution. Even though this technique has
been proven effective for small number of data samples, the phase substituition tech-
niques [18] can be used to isolate the injected effects with large number of samples.
Authors in [43] present a comprehensive study on shuffling, which is similar to mask-
ing. It was mentioned in [43] that the shuffling is effective when both the execution
order and the physical resource usage are randomized.
Non-deterministic processing and hardware balancing for power are the most ex-
plored hardware-based countermeasures against power analysis attacks. Non-Deterministic
Processors [28] execute instructions out-of-order, issuing independent code segments
randomly during runtime and therefore preventing the adversary from identifying the
places where specific instructions are executed. Dual-Rail circuits [15] (or Dual-Rail
Pre-charge (DRP) logic [34]) are designed to consume constant power regardless of
data processed. In Dual-Rail circuits, each logic circuit is attached to another similar
logic circuit, complementing the discharge occurring in the original logic circuit due
to bit-flips [37]. Other similar hardware balancing techniques are presented in [21,
34, 41, 42]. Residue Number Systems (RNS) based randomized hardware approach is
presented in [5], randomly chooses the moduli sets to obfuscate the binary double and
add operation from the power profile. This technique requires large data inputs to gain
advantage in performance, since RNS circuits cost in hardware. Furthermore, the pro-
posed technique in [5] is not complete and the authors have not tested the point double
and add for ECC. Tanimura and Dutt [38] propose an improvement for WDDL [42]
using a simulated annealing approach to automatically generate complementary cells
to reduce the information leakage from the power profile. This circuit level balancing
ExCCel approach [38] was further improved in [39, 40].
MUTE [7], a hardware/software information balancing technique, is a system level
microarchitectural countermeasure to protect against power analysis attacks. MUTE
uses two processors to execute the same encryption program with the actual and com-
plemented data, balancing information (against power). MUTE requires minimal soft-
ware instrumentation compared to the current flattening technique in [32]. It utilizes an
identical second core of the dual core processor and therefore requires minimal hard-
ware (for additional control logic) compared to the hardware balancing methods [15,
21, 22, 34, 37, 41, 42]. However, MUTE protects the system only against power anal-
ysis attacks.
The dual core secure embedded processor system presented in this paper, SecureD,
makes use of techniques similar to that of IMPRES [35] to detect code-injection attacks
and to that of MUTE [7] to protect against power analysis attacks. As far as we are
aware, there has been no embedded processor system, which is immune to both code-
injection and power analysis attacks.
2.1 Contributions
• A secure dual core embedded system is proposed to both detect code-injection
attacks and protect against power analysis attacks. As far as we are aware, this
is the first time an MPSoC solution is proposed to safeguard against both power
4
analysis and code injection, which are two of the major security threats in em-
bedded systems.
• The processor is capable of detecting bit-flips including those causing control
flow errors with minimal latency.
• An interrupt handling mechanism for an ASIP MPSoC is presented.
• A novel switching and synchronizing mechanism for information balancing to
counter power analysis is proposed which was not available in [7].
• A rapid simulation and synthesis environment is used for a dual core processor.
2.2 Limitations and Assumptions
• Our technique addresses only multiprocessor embedded systems with at least two
identical (homogeneous) processors. For heterogeneous multiprocessor systems,
identical functional units for encryption/decryption has to be used in two of the
processors.
• We assume that our system is self contained with separate memories for each of
the processors.
• Both processors are clocked by a single source.
3 Processor Architecture
In this section, we give an overview of SecureD architecture. We further discuss how
the code-injection detection technique similar to the one presented in [35] and the
power analysis protection similar to the one presented in [7] are integrated into Se-
cureD.
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Figure 1: The Base (Non Secure) Dual Core Processor with Memory Modules
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Figure 1 depicts the schematic diagram of the base dual core processor taken for
our design. As depicted, the processor has two identical cores with separate instruction
and data memories for each core. The base processor is statically scheduled to run
different threads/applications on each of its cores.
Figure 2 depicts how one of the cores from the base processor is altered so that it is
capable of detecting code-injection attacks and preventing power analysis attacks.
Base
Processor
Code-Injection Detection
Power Analysis Countermeasure
Registers:
incHashedReg
hashedReg
switchFlag
Instructions:
chk
startBal
endBal
SecureD
Base
Processor
Figure 2: Design Alterations to One of the Cores of the Base Processor
As depicted in Figure 2, each core of our system will be augmented by adding
registers and logic to handle additional instructions. The additional instructions and
registers encircled (see Figure 2) are used to detect code-injection attacks and the rest
to prevent power analysis attacks. Following subsections will detail architectural mod-
ifications and how they will be used in ensuring security in our SecureD processor.
3.1 SecureD for Detecting Code-injection Attacks
SecureD ensures code integrity of an application by verifying whether all basic blocks
of the program are intact at runtime [35]. This is achieved by performing basic block
integrity checks at runtime. The basic block integrity checker incorporates the follow-
ing tasks: (1) identifying basic blocks and calculating and assigning checksums for
each basic block at compile time; and (2) re-calculating the checksums at runtime and
comparing them with loaded static values.
At compile time, an application program is grouped into basic blocks based on
the control flow of the application. Then, each basic block is processed separately to
calculate a checksum based on the instructions of that block. The calculated checksum
is then inserted at the beginning of each basic block using a special instruction (chk
instruction).
At runtime, the first instruction of a loaded basic block is a chk instruction that car-
ries the checksum for the corresponding basic block. When an instruction of this kind is
fetched, the checksum is loaded into a special register (hashedReg). The checksum for
each basic block is incrementally re-calculated at runtime while instructions belonging
to the basic block are executed and is stored in another special register (incHashedReg).
The last instruction of each basic block is a control flow instruction (CFI), and if not,
one is inserted at compile time (if it is not present at the end of a basic block). CFIs
are altered such that they will (a) incrementally store checksums of their own, and (b)
compare the result against the one loaded through chk instructions. A mismatch in the
comparison will indicate a code integrity violation and generate an exception.
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3.2 SecureD for Preventing Power Analysis Attacks
When there is an encryption program to be executed, SecureD will use both of its
cores, where the first one will execute the original encryption program, while the sec-
ond core executes the complementary program in parallel. Similar to [7], the original
and complementary programs are devised by having the same instruction sequence but
complementary data processing. Hence, a clock cycle accurate synchronization is pre-
served, masking the information signature in the power profile. The memories are setup
statically, making the processor aware of where the programs are stored and which data
locations are used for different programs. The term balancing is used for this process
as was named in [7].
CORE1 CORE2
CONTROLLER
startBal
Encrypt:
____
____
endEncrypt:
endBal
Original
Program
Encrypt:
____
____
endEncrypt:
Complementary
Program
External 
Interrupt
A A
Registerfile, 
PC, HI, LO, 
hashed, 
incHashed
Figure 3: Switching and Synchronizing
The balancing is triggered and terminated by two special instructions which are
instrumented in the source code. As depicted in Figure 3, the execution of the startBal
instruction indicates the CONTROLLER that an encryption program is scheduled in the
core. An External Interrupt is sent to CORE2. This is a maskable interrupt which will
be triggered after all the pipelines are flushed. Necessary registers (such as the register-
file and program counter) of CORE2 are saved in the stack as shown in Figure 3. After
the registers are saved, the CONTROLLER sends the program counter (PC) values to
CORE1 and CORE2 on the same clock cycle (i.e., PC values of Encrypt in program
A and A). Both the original and complementary programs are executed in parallel
by CORE1 and CORE2 respectively. When the encryption is completed, the endBal
instruction in program A will be executed by CORE1, which will send a signal to the
CONTROLLER indicating the completion of encryption. The CONTROLLER restores
the saved registers from the stack. CORE2 will resume its execution and CORE1 will
be scheduled with the next program to be executed.
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3.3 Interrupt Handling and SecureD
This subsection describes how interrupts are handled by SecureD in two different sce-
narios: one, when SecureD is executing a regular application and two, while SecureD
is executing an encryption algorithm (that is during balancing). For both the scenarios,
interrupts will be serviced after the pipelines are flushed. Hence, the registers are up-
dated with correct values. Each interrupt routine will have three code segments: one,
instructions to save all the registers into the stack; two, the actual code for the routine;
and three, instructions to restore the registers from the stack and the end instruction
to terminate the interrupt. The end interrupt instruction sends a non-maskable inter-
rupt (NMI) to the CONTROLLER, which will force the controller to change the PC to
resume the original execution. In regular interrupt handling, the CONTROLLER will
change only the PC of the core which was servicing the interrupt and lets the other core
perform its normal execution.
However, handling an interrupt while the core is performing balancing is slightly
different. When a core receives an interrupt during balancing, the other core is put on
hold until the interrupt is serviced. The core on hold can also be allowed to execute the
next task in the queue, but with careful modification in the CONTROLLER to main-
tain synchronization for balancing. The NMI request will force the CONTROLLER to
change the PC of both cores to their original location to resume balancing. This is done
on the same clock cycle in-order to preserve synchronization.
4 Design Flow
In this section, an overview of the proposed design flow for the SecureD architecture is
discussed. First, the design of a software interface that allows the application to interact
with the architectural enhancement is described, and then the design of the architectural
enhancement itself is discussed.
4.1 Software Design Flow
Figure 4 depicts the software design flow of our framework. The source code of the
application program in C is compiled with the front-end of a compiler to generate
the assembly version of the application (.s files). Special instructions for both code-
injection detection (chk instructions with checksum values of basic blocks) and power
analysis protection (startBal and endBal) are instrumented into the assembly. The re-
sulting assembly files are assembled and linked to generate the binary (Instrumented
Binary in Figure 4) of the application.
4.2 Hardware Design Flow
Figure 5 depicts the generation of a processor model that implements SecureD. The In-
struction Set Architecture (ISA) is fed into an automatic processor design tool (ASIP-
Meister [1]) to generate each core of the processor model. Specifications of special
instructions for SecureD are given to ASIPMeister. Additional registers are chosen to
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Figure 4: Software Design Flow
implement secure functionalities. Interrupts are selected and implemented for switch-
ing and synchronizing processors. The logical functionalities of the special instructions
and interrupts are specified as micro-instructions. The single core processor model in
VHDL is generated using the generate hardware module of ASIPMeister.
ISA of the 
target arch.
Hardware
 Design Flow
Processor
Select Special
Instructions
Select Special
Registers
Select 
Interrupts
Code Micro 
Instructions for 
the ISA
Generate 
Hardware
ASIP Design Tool
Figure 5: Hardware Design Flow
ASIPMeister generates a synthesizable VHDL description of a single processor
model, thus two identical processors are generated separately and are combined man-
ually to make the VHDL model of SecureD. Additional components such as the CON-
TROLLER as shown in Figure 3 are added during the manual combining process.
5 Experimental Setup
Our SecureD framework is implemented using processors with the PISA (Portable In-
struction Set Architecture) instruction set (as implemented in SimpleScalar Tool Set
with a six stage pipeline) processor without cache. Figure 6 illustrates the experi-
mental setup, identifying key elements and tools. Programs in C are compiled using
GNU/GCC cross compiler for the PISA instruction set. The Instrumented Binary is
produced as explained in Section 4.1. The processor model represents the SecureD
processor in VHDL description.
Synopsys® Design Compiler is used to synthesize the processor model as shown
in Figure 6. Hardware details are reported by the Design Compiler. The instrumented
binary is processed to set up both data and program memories. Modelsim VHDL
simulator is used to simulate the synthesized processor and the memory models to
deduce the runtime (in number of clock cycles).
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6 Results
This section presents the hardware and runtime overhead details of our SecureD pro-
cessor, comparing with the processors implemented for only detecting code-injection
attacks - SecureD-I [35], and for only protecting against power analysis attacks - Se-
cureD-M [7].
6.1 Hardware Summary
Table 1 tabulates the hardware summary produced by Design Compiler for all proces-
sors investigated. The CMOS 65nm technology is used. Non-SecureD is a processor
with dual cores and without any secure implementations. SecureD-M costs an addi-
tional 1.9% and 2.7% in gates and cells respectively, while SecureD-I costs an addi-
tional 1.3% and 1.5% compared to the Non-Secure processor. SecureD costs 3.8% area
overhead in both gates and cells.
Table 1: Hardware Details
Area Cell Area Clock
(# of gates) (# of cells) (ns)
Non-SecureD 484180 132828 31.58
SecureD-M 493330 136496 31.06
SecureD-I 490715 134812 31.94
SecureD 502830 137906 31.80
The SecureD-M processor has a slight decrease in the clock width of the critical
path because of the optimizations performed by the Design Compiler. SecureD-I has a
slight increase in the clock due to its runtime checksumming logic. SecureD expectedly
has an increased clock width compared to Non-SecureD and SecureD-M and a slightly
decreased clock width compared to SecureD-I because of the optimizations.
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Hardware Summary in FPGA
The base dual core and SecureD processors were implemented on an FPGA (XC2V3000-
4FG676) and the hardware details are presented in Table 2. SecureD consumes an ad-
ditional 10.8% in slices, 2.8% in LUTS, 1.5% in IOBs compared to the non-secure
dual core processor Non-SecureD. Clock width has slightly increased in addition to the
hardware overhead in logics, such as LUTs, IOBs and slices.
Table 2: Hardware Details in XC2V3000-4FG676
Non-SecureD SecureD
Hardware
Slice Flip-flops (28672) 4300 4823
4 input LUTs (28672) 16476 16942
Bonded IOBs (842) 410 416
GCLKs (16) 1 1
Timing
Clock (ns) 209 216
Logic Levels 515 529
6.2 Runtime Analysis
Figure 7 depicts the runtime analysis of all four configurations of our dual core pro-
cessors (Non-SecureD, SecureD-M, SecureD-I and SecureD) for different benchmark
applications. Out of the seven applications tabulated, two (DES and AES) are con-
sidered to be encryption algorithms and balancing is enabled while they are executed.
Each cell in the table (see Figure 7) has 4 parts, where the top left part specifies the
runtime of a particular application on the non-secure dual core (Non-SecureD), the top
right part represents the runtime on SecureD-M processor, the bottom left part indi-
cates the runtime on Secured-I processor and the bottom right part has the runtime of
an application on SecureD processor. The Non-SecureD neither includes the balancing
feature nor the code injection detection feature, whereas the SecureD-I only includes
the code injection detection feature. The SecureD-M design only contains the balanc-
ing solution to prevent power analysis whereas the SecureD processor prevents both
the attacks.
When two applications are scheduled on dual cores, the runtime of the application
which is higher is considered for the net runtime of the two applications. Hence, the
cells along the diagonal of the table (in Figure 7) represent the runtime of each ap-
plication alone. Since adpcm.encode has the highest runtime amongst all programs,
combinations with adpcm.encode will be having the runtime of adpcm.encode (e.g.,
see Non-SecureD cells in column two of Figure 7).
In SecureD-M and SecureD configurations, when either AES or DES (encryption
algorithms) is scheduled to one of the cores, the application scheduled on the second
core has to wait until the balancing of AES or DES comes to an end (i.e., when bal-
ancing is performed, both cores will be executing the same program, either AES or
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DES, with complementary values). Note that, currently, balancing is performed only
for AES and DES in the given set of benchmark applications. For example, the runtime
of applications adpcm.encode and DES encrypt scheduled on SecureD-M (see Figure 7
row 2, column 2), is the addition of the runtime of DES encrypt on both cores (for
balancing), the time taken for switching, and the runtime of adpcm.encode on one of
the cores which is performed after the balancing finishes.
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Figure 7: Runtime Comparisons
As depicted in Figure 7, the cells corresponding to SecureD-I consume additional
time due to the runtime check-summing used for detecting code integrity violations.
The average runtime overhead of SecureD-I for all seven applications is 6.06%. Com-
pared to the runtime of Non-SecureD configuration, SecureD-M consumes extra run-
time only when either AES or DES is scheduled on one of or both the cores. The av-
erage runtime overhead of all seven applications on SecureD-M is 15.4% compared to
Non-SecureD. As SecureD integrates both code-injection detection and power analysis
protection, it consumes extra runtime similar to that of SecureD-I when no application
with encryption (such as AES or DES) is present. SecureD consumes additional run-
time compared to SecureD-I when applications such as AES or DES are scheduled to
one or both of the cores. The average runtime overhead of SecureD with two encryption
and five regular applications is 20.0%.
Table 3 presents the delay in number of clock cycles for switching and interrupt
servicing during balancing. All 37 registers including the 32 registers in the register-
file are saved and restored sequentially. Every time an external interrupt is fired (to
switch to balancing or to service interrupt) there is a 6 clock cycle delay to flush the
pipeline to update all the registers. A clock cycle delay is consumed for each interrupt
call or switch instruction (startBal). Another clock cycle delay is needed to exit the
interrupt or to exit balancing (using endBal instruction).
12
Table 3: Switching and Interrupt Servicing Delay
Clock Cycles
Delay
Store Register-file 320
Store PC,HI,LO registers 30
Store incHashed, hashed 20
Restore Register-file 320
Restore PC,HI,LO registers 30
Restore incHashed, hashed 20
Flush Pipelines 6
Interrupt to switch 1
Exit the interrupt 1
Total Delay 748
7 Discussions
This paper focuses on power analysis based side channel attacks. Our solution can be
further applied to electromagnetic based side channel attacks [20], however not tested.
Previous techniques have proven that the DPA resistant techniques have also prevented
DPA, since electro-magnetic emmissions are closely related to power dissipations [16,
18].
We assume that the processors are designed and layed out as homogeneous compo-
nents which will dissipate around the same amount of power. However, this could be
a challenging task and would require manual design considerations. We could use the
CoRaS solution [4] to counteract this limitation by randomly swapping rounds of the
encryption/decryption between processors.
We assume that we do not have caches in our MPSoC or disable caches during the
balancing operation. This is to make sure we execute both the processors in instruction-
level lock-step mode. Cache locking mechanisms [9] can be utilized during secure
execution, if we want to implement cache to enhance performance.
8 Conclusions
In this paper, we have presented SecureD, a dual core based multiprocessor, which
is immune to code-injection attacks and power analysis based side-channel attacks.
Both these attacks are considered to be the most successful attacks in embedded sys-
tems in recent years. SecureD protects against code-injection by performing static time
basic block instrumentation (with checksums) and runtime comparison for detecting
code integrity violations and power analysis is prevented by implementing information
balancing to mask the actual information (or the secret key) from the power profile.
SecureD is easily scalable beyond dual processors and has minimal performance and
hardware overhead compared to previous techniques proposed to separately handle the
attacks.
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